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not appear in alphabetical order, but in order of completion. The complete Survey 
wi l l be published in the usual printed version when the comments arising out of 




1. Recent economic trends: Introduction and summary 
During 1979 Nicaragua experienced virtually the most profound, changes 
in its history, with the end of a c iv i l war which came to a head in July but 
whose root causes go back a considerable t in» . The victory of the people's 
insurrection gave rise to a total change of administration, with the 
assumption of power by a pol i t ica l movement whose approach to economic and 
social development is totally different from that of the previous government. 
Since this change took place right in the middle of the year under review, i t 
seems appropriate f i r s t to consider br ie f ly the way in which the economic 
situation of the country had been worsening, especially since 1978, to the 
point where i t culminated in the middle of 1979 in an unprecedented cris is . 
The most important pol i t ical events in the second half of the year w i l l then 
be reviewed. 
For a number of years the country had been a f f l ic ted by economic 
deterioration, which, combined with c iv i l disturbances obviously already 
latent in 1978, had given rise to a situation which at that time was already 
considered to be without precedent although i t cannot be compared with the 
situation which arose in the middle of 1979 when the previous administration 
disappeared from the scene.1/ 
The general state of deterioration in almost a l l economic activities in 
1978 had been partial ly mitigated by the relatively favourable performance of 
agricultural production. However, the insufficient f i sca l revenues, the need 
to sustain relatively high current expenditure to cover increasingly high 
operating expenses (including military spending), the gradual slowing down 
of capital expenditure and the pressure of external debt servicing had been 
resulting in substantial increases in loans from abroad. The crisis gradually 
got worse during the f i r s t half of 1979 as violent incidents increased and 
became more generalized and l i t t l e by l i t t l e turned into a civi l war. 




Meanwhile, certain entrepreneurial circles, not directly linked with 
the then centre of pol it ical power, had been moving closer to the insurrection 
movement, with the result that activities were paralyzed, f i r s t partial ly and 
later total ly. This led to the adoption of political.measures to deal with 
the consequent economic bottlenecks and to development which culminated in 
a great economic depression. Moreover, the group which had been in power for 
four decades had made possible a very wide variety of means of getting capital 
out of the country and dismantling the production equipment, and much of its 
e f fort was directed towards the military defence of its interests. 
In the early months of 1979, faced with the worsening of the economic 
situation, the Government adopted some measures aimed at reducing the effects 
of the above imbalances., Among other things, in February i t ordered advanced 
deposits equivalent to 100% of the value of most imports, and at the beginning 
of the second quarter of the year, i t devalued the cordoba by more than 40%, 
establishing different rates for the purchase and sale of foreign currency, 
and also decreed that the resources generated by the difference in the buying 
and sell ing rates of foreign currency should be transferred to the central 
government. 
The worsening of hosti l it ies and the creeping paralyzation of activities 
make i t impossible to judge how effective the provisions adopted at that time 
might have been; however, in the light of the existing economic registers, i t 
may be affirmed that, in addition, to speculation and looting, there was an 
immediate wave of price rises of a magnitude unprecedented in the country, 
caused in part,by the fai lure of the supply of national and imported products. 
The scarcity of imports was due,to a very marked decline in foreign trade 
caused in part by the paralyzation of activities and in part by the extension 
of the war to almost a l l parts of the country, which had a direct ef fect on 
trade with Central.America. The exchange rate measures adopted discouraged 
foreign sales, although during the f i r s t half, of the year the Government had 
completely f i l l e d the annual quota of meat sales to the United States in order 
to accelerate the inflow of foreign currency. 
As a result, when the change of government took place the economic 
situation was cr it ical ; externally, the country was in a state of almost total 
financial insolvency, and i t was totally demonetized at the domestic level. 
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A large proportion of the economic activities were paralyzed (the area planted 
with the main export product, cotton, for example, had fal len by 75% in 
comparison with the previous growing season), and open unemployment was 
extremely high; stocks of both imported raw materials and of essential products^ 
chiefly food, were nearly exhausted, and the health situation was desperate. 
All this was compounded by the loss of human l i f e and the material damage 
caused by the fighting.2/ 
In these conditions, the new administration had, from the middle of the 
year, to meet the challenge of reactivating the economy as soon as possible and 
at the same time laying the groundwork for a mixed economy,3/ while assigning 
the highest priority, however, to meeting the basic needs of the people,4/ 
in which the State discharges an essential function, with particular attention 
to the role of public ownership, known as the Area de Propiedad del Pueblo. 
Among the f i r s t measures adopted by the Government were the seizure of 
enterprises belonging to the group which had been in power, the nationalization 
of banking and foreign trade and the institution of agrarian reform. The 
latter was basically oriented towards the administration of the enterprises 
which had been seized and the distribution of land, some of i t among 
co-operatives, in areas which had hitherto been unexploited.5/ 
2/ It is estimated that approximately 35,000 lives were lost and that 
material damage amounted to some US$ 500 million. See CEPAL, Nicaragua: 
Repercusiones económicas de los acontecimientos políticos recientes, 
(E/CEPAL/G.1091), August 1979. 
3/ See Programa de l a Junta de Gobierno de Reconstrucción Nacional de 
Nicaragua, 9 July 1979. 
4/ The new policy of giving priority to the satisfaction of the basic needs 
of the population, particularly food and above a l l child nutrition, w i l l 
mean that in the short run much of the milk and dairy production usually 
exported to the Central American Common Market w i l l be absorbed by the 
domestic market. 
5/ I f , in addition to the seizures, account is taken of the very low level 
of activity previously carried out by public enterprises and the impact 
of nationalization, i t is estimated that the public sector's share in 
production in 1980 wi l l be as follows: crop farming, 17%; livestock 
production, 12%; forestry, 70%; hunting and fishing, 95%; manufacturing, 
25%; construction, 70%; mining, 95%; commerce, 30%; transport and 
communications, 60%; electric power and drinking water, 100%, and other 
services, 10%. (See Programa de Emergencia y Reactivación en Beneficio 
del Pueblo, 1980-1981, Ministry of Planning, 11 Jan.uary 1980.) 
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In order to reactivate a l l sectors of the economy, innumerable obstacles 
had to be overcome. One was the lack of inputs for the agricultural sector 
(seeds for the f i r s t sowings, fe r t i l i zers , insecticides and the l i ke ) , and in 
the case of many of these inputs international aid was urgently required, 6/ 
Another problem was the loss of certain capital goods and the 
deterioration of and damage to mechanical equipment^ s i l os , some sugar mil ls , 
the cotton gins, and coffee processing plants, industrial machinery and motor 
vehicles. 
Moreover, after a structural change such as the one which occurred in 
Nicaragua, i t takes some time for the new system to reach maturity, especially 
when a different conception of economic policy is applied from the beginning. 
On the one hand, the uncertainty produced by the change made the private sector 
hesitant about reactivating its enterprises, while on the other, the shortage 
of human resources and the disorganization which prevailed when the new 
Government took over limited its capacity to embark simultaneously on a l i the 
priority tasks required for reconstruction. 
In spite of a l l these problems, the measures adopted during the f i r s t few 
months gave satisfactory results in some cases: for example, the setting of 
guaranteed prices for grains induced some sectors to participate rapidly in the 
action suggested by o f f i c i a l policy, by sowing crops although i t was late in 
the season. However, the lack of essential industrial inputs, the dif f iculty 
of effectively restructuring the financial system in such a short, time and, 
above a l l , the demand by entrepreneurs: for the fixing of new "rules of the 
game" delayed f u l l and effective reactivation, which showed signs of taking 
place at the end of 1979 and the beginning of 1980, once the emergency programme 
to reactivate the economy for the benefit of the people had been prepared 
under the co-ordination of the Ministry of Planning. 7/ Some of the obstacles 
have been gradually surmounted through efforts to secure the speedy application 
of tripartite production agreements between the State, the workers and private 
6/ After peace was restored, international support for the new Nicaraguan 
order was mobilized,-with a number of Latin American countries • 
participating in various ways. 
7/ The f ina l version of this programme was published on 14 January 1980. 
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enterprise. The objective has been to ensure the provision of inputs and 
financing by the State, labour by the workers, and minimum production quotas 
and the payment of the agreed wages by private enterprise. 
The f inal economic results for the year indicate that the country is 
s t i l l in a very critical situation although a certain level of international 
reserves has been restored. The gross domestic product, which had already 
dropped by 6% in 1978, f e l l by 25% in 1979 (see table 1). Because of the 
depressed situation of the economy, imports dropped sharply, and although the 
value of exports f e l l too, the trade in goods and services showed a positive 
balance of US$ 140 million, while there was a somewhat smaller surplus of 
US$ 84 million on the current account. 
At the end of 1979, the State-guaranteed public external debt was close 
to US$ 1,160 million (comparedwith US$ 960 million the previous year), but 
i t is estimated that the total external debt probably amounted to US$ 1,500 
million. Indeed, i f the external debt incurred had been serviced, debt 
servicing alone would have come close to US$ 600 million, roughly equivalent 
to the total exports of goods and services in 1979, 
The extreme gravity of the economic situation through which Nicaragua 
is passing is further reflected by the f i sca l deficit which was equivalent to 
over 40% of total government expenditure, the rate of open unemployment, which 
is estimated to have been slightly less than 28% of the labour force in October, 
and the rate of domestic inflation (77% between December 1978 and December 1979 
and 48% in terms of the variation between annual averages). 
The style of development which Nicaragua has set i t se l f is very much its 
own, very distinctive, and virtually without precedent in the Latin American 
region,^/ Since the middle of 1979, planning has become a strategic function 
in the formulation, harmonization and co-ordination of economic policies. In 
the work accomplished (such as the emergency plan for the reactivation of the 
economy for the benefit of the people) and in the application of the various 
measures adopted, selective criteria have begun to be applied which reflect 
8/ The policy postulated is one which strives to give preference to the 
satisfaction of the most essential needs, such as food, health and 
education. An example of the way i t works is the mass literacy campaign 
begun at the end of March 1980, 
/the great 
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the great concern over the shortage of supplies, the low level of wages , the 
high rates of unemployment and underemployment and the prevailing inflation 
and lack of l iquidity, and which seek to tackle these constraints organically 
in the reactivation work, in.which it is envisaged that the agricultural sector 
wi l l play a key role. The new form of government is so organized that its 
institutional structure is very different from the one inherited from the 
past, not only in the large number of dhallenges in i t ia l ly tackled but also 
in that the role of the public sector is conceived differently. 
2. Recent economic trends 
^ Total supply and demand 
Analysis of the trends observed in total supply and demand during the 
past two years quantitatively confirms the increasing deterioration of the 
Nicaraguan economy and the critical situation in which the country finds 
i t se l f . Thus the unprecedented decline in total economic activity by 
-7.2% in 1978 and nearly -25% in 1979 was surpassed by the drops in imports 
of -23% in 1978 and -38% in 1979 (see table 2). This was due to the 
generalized imbalances and paralyzatioh of the economy, especially during the 
period of c ivi l war, and also to the impossibility of achieving effective 
reactivation during the second half of 1979. 
The decline in the gross domestic product in 1978 was not as pronounced 
as i t might have been because agricultural production was relatively high 
owing to a good rainy season and partially offset the slump in the other 
economic activities. In 1979, however, the general deterioration of a l l the 
productive sectors in the country made the product f a l l abruptly by nearly 25%. 
The slump in domestic activities and the serious external bottleneck 
caused imports to f a l l more sharply in 1979,9/ so that the import coefficient 
dropped from slightly higher than 29% in 1970 to l i t t l e more than 25% in 1979. 
The drop in imports, which was partly responsible for the depletion of stocks, 
was especially f e l t in the manufacturing sector, which uses a high percentage 
of imported inputs. 
9/ In global terms, the volume of imports in 1979 was lower than in 1963, 
while in per capita terms i t was lower than in 1959. 
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On the demand side, the slump reached serious levels as regards both 
domestic demand and exports. During 1978 exports and government consumption 
were the only growth elements in total demand, while in 1979 a l l the 
components of total demand f e l l . Thus, the volume of external sales f e l l by 
23%, mainly as a result of the deterioration in exports of coffee and cotton 
to markets outside the region and in sales of chemicals, mostly to the 
Central American market. 
Among the components of domestic demand which went down, i t is worth 
mentioning that total gross domestic investment registered a negative balance, 
in absolute terms, of over 250 million c6rdobas - another unprecedented situatior 
which is explained by the fact that urgent supply needs caused tremendous•losses 
in stocks through destruction, looting and natural exhaustion which far exceeded 
the amount of resources allocated to building up the fixed capital assets.10/ 
There were no major differences between the decline in public investment and 
that in private investment, the former having gone down mainly because 
expenditure was redirected to meet current needs and the latter because of 
the lack of incentives to expand the productive capacity. The decline was 
very apparent in the construction sector, where activity dropped by nearly 
77% after having fal len by 41% the preceding year (see table 2). 
As a result of this general deterioration and the high level of 
unemployment and underemployment, private consumption f e l l by 18%. Although 
government consumption also decreased, i t dropped by less than any other 
component of demand, its decrease being moderated by the fact that during both 
halves of the year essential services had to be maintained and in particular 
government employees s t i l l had to be paid. 
Undoubtedly the paralysis of activity which had been spreading 
throughout the economy during the f i r s t half of the year readied a peak 
which was not perceptible immediately after the change of government but began 
to become apparent when the measures to revitalize the economy were applied: 
the reconstruction efforts initiated in August, the reorganization of many 
public services, the credit policy which was put into effect in the f inal 




months of the year to promote the resumption of activity, and the policy of 
gradually absorbing unemployed and underemployed labour, 
(b ) Sectoral developments 
The downward trends recorded in 1978 became more pronounced in 1979 in 
a l l economic activities with the exception of1 mining, which is of l i t t l e 
importance in Nicaragua, The greatest f a l l was observed in construction, 
which went down by 77%, and the least in gojrernment activity and the 
generation of electricity, which dropped byi 2%, and in the agricultural sector, i 
whose product f e l l by 13%. The remaining activities declined by between 23% 
and 39% (see table 3). 
( i ) Agriculture. In 1978 crop-farming output increased by 7%, thereby 
attenuating the impact of the slump which had beset the economy in general. 
At the end of the year, however, in spite of the good yields and excellent 
prospects of cotton and coffee, the producers had to face up to serious 
problems which made them less will ing not only to continue investing but also 
to maintain the production levels reached, • From the early months of 1979, 
agricultural activity was affected by the worsening pol i t ica l cr is is , the lack 
of financing for the harvesting of crops, the di f f icult ies of procuring 
pesticides and other necessary inputs, the breakdown of the entire productive 
apparatus and the uncertainty reigning among many entrepreneurs, a considerable 
proportion of whom were opposed to the government. 
Moreover, the agricultural sector continued to deteriorate throughout 
the year. The heightening of the conflict as from the second quarter of 1979 
had a number of adverse effects on fanning activit ies. Even the growing cycle 
was partial ly disrupted by the fighting, since some products could not be sown 
and others could not be harvested. In addition9 the deterioration in the 
production of basic grains, which are essential for food, made i t necessary to 
replace them by other foods, such as meat, with the result that at certain 
times in the year there were sizeable drops in stocks, essentially of poultry, 
which were subsequently made up for by imports on an unprecedented scale.. 
The disorganization of the productive apparatus also prevented the normal use 
of agricultural machinery, which had deteriorated greatly and needed repairs 
which could not be made during the year. 
/As a 
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As a result of these developments, the agricultural product f e l l by 13%, 
The decrease was especially severe in the case of cotton (an export item which 
traditionally provided about 25% of the total inflow of foreign currency), the 
most important domestic consumer products, and the entire stock-raising 
subsector (see table 4), From the beginning this drop in production constituted 
one of the most serious stumbling blocks in the establishment of the new policy, 
which was designed precisely to eliminate shortages of some essential foodstuffs 
The decline in cotton production during the calendar year amounted to 
nearly 25%, Moreover, i t is probable that the harvest of the 1979/1980 
agricultural season wi l l prove to be much lower than that of the preceding 
season because only about 25% of the land normally planted with cotton had 
been sown before the mid-year rainy season. In view of the damage to the crops 
sown caused by supply problems and lack of credit, i t is also likely that the 
average yield per hectare w i l l be lower. Furthermore, a similar decline in 
the production of cotton-seed had a very negative effect on the edible o i l 
industry, which was deprived of its principal raw material. 
The crit ical situation resulting from the deterioration in the production 
of cotton was partial ly offset by the performance of other crops, especially 
coffee. The renovation programmes carried out in past years in the 
plantations meant that the conflict did not af fect coffee production much, and 
i t rose by about 9%, This rise was especially significant because, following 
the extraordinary increases in the international price of coffee during 1976 
and 1977, in 1978 coffee led Nicaraguan exports in value and retained that 
position in 1979 owing to the drop in the production of cotton. 
Nevertheless, results would have been better i f production had not been 
affected by four problems. In the f i r s t place, because of the armed conflict, 
i t was not possible to give this crop the constant attention i t requires; 
secondly, some of the f ac i l i t i es for processing coffee were destroyed or 
damaged; thirdly, from April onwards there was a long interruption in the 
work to control the coffee rust which had been carried out since 1978, 
especially in the department of Carazo; and f ina l ly , in the last few months of 
the year, despite the high incidence of open unemployment at the national leve l , 
some coffee growing areas continued to suffer from a shortage of pickers, 
thus causing further losses, 
/In spite 
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In spite of the problems of a general nature which affected a l l 
economic activity in the country, in the f ina l months of the year the 
production of sugar cane resumed its normal growth rate, with the result 
that i t increased by slightly more than 3% in the year as a whole. 
With regard to production for domestic consumption, i t may be noted 
that small farmers f a r from the main combat areas managed to carry out their 
early sowing in relatively normal conditions, so that their production was 
not much affected, while the late sowing was begun after the conflict was 
over. The situation was dif ferent, however, on the commercial plantations, 
especially those on the Pacific coast. 
The production of crops such as maize, beans, r ice, sorghum and blonde 
tobacco f e l l by between 19% and 32% during 1979 (see table 4), Like cotton, 
the f i r s t three of these commodities recorded drops in production because not 
so much land as usual was planted. The decrease was not so great in the case 
of sorghum, possibly because some of the land traditionally planted with 
cotton was used for sorghum. 
Livestock production also deteriorated significantly. As regards 
cattle, a promotion policy aimed at the improvement of the herds and the 
introduction of new techniques had been applied and had made i t possible to 
raise external sales substantially. In 1979 the conflict had various kinds 
of impact on the organization of the livestock sector. On the one hand, 
in the early months of the year the i l l ega l export of live cattle, including 
especially breeding bulls and cows, became prevalent and was even to some 
extent faci l itated and furthermore during the same period the export of meat 
was speeded up to such an extent that almost the entire quota allocated to 
Nicaragua for the United States market was met. The practice of slaughtering 
cattle prematurely, begun in 1978, was continued. 
Pig and poultry farms were also affected although, as pointed out above, 
i t was later possible to rebuild the stocks, especially in the case of 
poultry. 
During 1979 there was also a significant deterioration in production 
of milk (-17%), and eggs (-33%). In absolute terms, milk production f e l l by 
about 20 million gallons and egg production by approximately 12 million 
dozen.11/ 
— — — — — ! 
11/ This is equivalent to an annual pep capita decrease of 30 l itres of 
milk and 55 eggs. \ 
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Since the present Government assumed power in July, one of its main 
concerns has been to meet the demand for food, which, because of the sharp 
f a l l in agricultural production, was one of the most serious problems facing 
the economy. To this end, in addition to the imports which were carried 
out as a matter of urgency and the international aid received, efforts were 
made to increase late planting as much as possible by using land which i t had 
been impossible to plant with cotton. In this e f fort preference was given to 
the planting of maize, beans, sorghum, sesame, and peanuts, the latter two 
items being intended to replace some of the raw materials needed to produce 
edible o i l . In addition, in September the Instituto Nicaragliense de Re forma 
Agraria (Nicaraguan Agrarian Reform Institute - INRA) sowed about 
11,000 manzanas with rice, i . e . , 40% of the area traditionally given over to 
this crop. However, a l l these efforts were s t i l l insufficient to cover the 
domestic def icit , and a number of items w i l l probably s t i l l have to be 
imported in 1980, 
Among the main policy measures taken by the present Government, was 
the seizure of estates which had belonged to the former ruling group 12/ and 
which were entrusted to INRA for the purpose of initiating an integrated 
rural development system as part of what is now known as the Area de Propiedad 
del Pueblo (APP).13/ Secondly, with a view to tackling the main problems of 
the sector, a number of measures of an institutional nature were gradually 
adopted. These measures culminated in the unification of the policy-making 
functions, which had been in the hands of a number of bodies in the in i t ia l 
phase of the present administration. Thus, decision-making is now centralized 
in the Ministry of Agricultural Development, which is responsible for INRA 
and other institutions. 
12/ These estates amount to about 350,000 hectares, including 
60,000 hectares of high-yield farm land given over primarily to the 
cultivation of sugar cane, r ice, coffee and tobacco and 100,000 hectares 
sown with grass and supporting about 40,000 head of cattle; the rest 
was unexploited. 
13/ This land normally produces approximately 45% of Nicaragua's sugar 
cane, 50% of the r ice, 13% of the coffee, 10% of the cotton and 20% 
of the basic grains, 
/To combat 
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To combat the deterioration of agricultural machinery and to organize 
the work of repairing i t quickly, a special State enterprise known as AGROMEC 
was created, but in i t ia l ly i t experienced dif f icult ies in importing the 
necessary spare parts. 
Decreee No. 3 on the confiscation of the property of the former ruling 
group was applied in the light of the fact that a large number of the 
production units were run on the basis of specific technologies. Consequently, 
these production units were preserved as such, but placed under a new central 
administrative structure - the State enterprise AGROINRA, which is basically 
concerned with sugar-cane and sugar mills, meat packing, rice and coffee. 
Some of the unexploited confiscated land was distributed to co-operatives, but 
most of i t remained under the direct administration of the State. 
Altogether, the public-owned sector generates approximately 20% of 
total agricultural production. Thus, in spite of the changes which have been 
taking place as part of the present revolutionary process, the sector 
remaining in the hands of private owners is s t i l l essential to the economy, 
thus constituting a mixed-economy structure. 
However, the rapid changes made with the participation and support of 
those private sectors of the country which had been opposed to the previous 
régime caused hesitation in a number of f ields of activity, and moreover i t 
was not easy to reactivate the agricultural sector immediately because of the 
problems noted above. Al l this, in conjunction with the new administrative 
structure of the country and the new domestic financial system, to which 
reference wi l l be made later, produced a certain amount of stagnation in 
private circles and some delay in the resumption of work. 
The Government made the basic objective of i ts short-term programme 
the recovery of the production levels of 1977 and 1978 in the next agricultural 
season, together with the consolidation of the "new structures for production, 
marketing and financing in the agricultural sector and the strengthening of 
the single, co-ordinated and planned direction of this sector". Another of 
its basic objectives is to "consolidate the new credit policy which benefits 
small producers in particular, both in export production and in the 
production of basic grains, where there is a great peasant base".14/ 
14/ See Programa de emergencia y reactivación en beneficio del pueblo, 
1980-1981, Ministry of Planning, 14 January 1980. 
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In addition, some large-scale projects aimed at capitalizing the 
country's agriculture have begun to be implemented. Preference is being 
given to the consideration.of integrated regional projects, such as the one 
on the African palm and other permanent crops, with a view to integrating 
agriculture and manufacturing. 
Finally, an attempt is being made to promote the fishery sector despite 
the loss of a large number of boats, which were used to carry elements closely 
linked to the former régime out of the country. Towards the end of the year, 
progress began to be made in the recovery of some of these vessels. The 
sector was given some incentive by the creation in January 1980 of the 
Nicaraguan Fishery Institute,15/ through which i t is intended to centralize 
the co-ordination and rationalization of the exportation of the country's 
fishery resources and their marketing abroad. Technical assistance is also 
being received from other Latin American countries in this connexion. 
( i i ) Mining. The production of this sector, which is of scant 
significance to the Nicaraguan economy,16/ had been declining since 1977, but 
in 1979 mining was the only sector which showed a positive growth rate 
(27%), mainly because of the exploitation of gold. The new administration 
is encouraging the mining sector, which i t believes has high growth potential, 
and has adopted some policies of an institutional nature aimed at its 
reorganization. Thus, at the beginning of November, a decree was adopted 
providing for the nationalization of mining and the creation of a specialized 
enterprise called the Nicaraguan Mining Development Corporation (CONDEMINA).17/ 
This body wi l l be responsible for the development of the country's mineral 
resources and wi l l receive advisory assistance from the Nicaraguan Natural 
Resources and Environment Institute (IRENA). 
15/ See Decree No. 233, Ley creadora del Instituto Nicaragiiense de l a Pesca 
5 January 1980. 
16/ Although its importance has perhaps been underrated in the past, because 
when the mines were being nationalized i t became apparent that the gold 
exporting enterprises had consistently understated the value of this 
metal in their sales abroad. 
17/ See Decree No. 137, Ley de Nacionalizacion del Sector Minero y CreaciSn 
de CONDEMINA, 2 November 1979. 
/ ( i i i ) Manufacturing. 
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( i i i ) Manufacturing» In 1979 industrial production f e l l by over 27% 
(see table 5), Manufacturing had already begun to show signs of deterioration 
in 1978, due to the climate of uncertainty, the oonsequent f l ight of capital, 
and the drop in domestic demand for consumer goods and the pace of economic 
activity in general, and this situation worsened during the early months of 
1979. In addition to the fact that their suppliers had virtually suspended 
the flow of credit to them owing to the risks that the pol i t ica l instability 
might occasion, entrepreneurs were faced with increasing financial problems 
due to the cr is is , and a l l this limited their capacity to import the necessary 
raw materials. Moreover, the introduction of the advance deposit of 100% 
on imports of most items and the devaluation of the córdoba caused external 
purchases of inputs to decrease, thereby setting up a vicious circle which 
contributed to the generalized rise in domestic prices. Consequently, the 
industrial branches most severely a f f l icted from the beginning of 1979 were 
those which depended most on imported raw materials. 
Except in the case of the refining of petroleum, a product for which 
demand remained relatively high during the confl ict, industrial production 
f e l l markedly and in some cases, such as that of the metalworking industries, 
the drop was between 40% and 54%. The drop was less severe in the case of 
food and leather, since these items are more essential components in the mass 
demand of the population, but even so both of these branches deteriorated by 
an abnormally large amount (18%). Some indirect indicators of industrial 
production, such as the amount of electric power used and the number of people 
employed, provide quantitative confirmation of the negative evolution of the 
sector, since they f e l l by 26% and 14%, respectively (see table 5). 
Partly as a result of the situation described above and also because of 
transport problems, exports of manufactures, whose main outlet is the Central 
American Common Market, f e l l notably. 
Moreover, i t i s estimated that, in terms of replacement value, the armed 
conflict caused losses to industry amounting to nearly 1,650 million córdobas 
- 700 córdobas in fixed assets, 513 córdobas in stocks of raw materials and 
/finished products 
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finished products, 293 c6rdobas in financial holdings, and 139 cordobas 
representing the wages paid for the two months in which activities were 
paralyzed.18/ 
According to estimates contained in o f f i c i a l data published in August 
on 100 medium- and large-scale enterprises which were severely damaged or 
in some cases almost totally destroyed, the most severely a f f l icted industrial 
subsectors were foodstuffs and agricultural implements, beverages, texti les, 
paints and some of the metalworking subsectors. 
In those enterprises which became part of the Area de Propiedad 
del Pueblo, recovering during the second half of the year was only partial . 
The major problems which had to be faced included the disarticulation of the 
productive apparatus and the lack of capital, supplies of raw materials and 
spare parts for machinery. In many cases these problems have s t i l l not been 
solved because of inadequate financial resources and the inability of 
entrepreneurs to pay. 
In this connexion, the new Government promptly adopted measures to 
promote production. It was laid down that the foreign currency generated 
by industrial exports could be used to finance imports of raw materials. 
The credit system was rationalized, and arrangements for lending through the 
new Development Bank were made more f lexible with a view to accelerating the 
replacement of equipment and fac i l i t ies and reconstituting the working capital. 
It was also decided to continue using the Central American Agreement on f i sca l 
Incentives for Industrial Development until 1983, but with strict controls 
on tax exemptions and reductions. 
The industrial policy adopted by the Ministry of Industry was reflected 
in a number of significant changes in certain activities: the new price rises 
requested by the local petroleum refinery were refused, and the Government 
assumed responsibility for the importation of crude and for negotiating its 
price on relatively favourable terms; i t was decided to suspend exports of 
salt and leather products temporarily, since those items were required as 
inputs in domestic activities; with respect to some foodstuffs, such as maize 
18/ See Evaluaci6n de los daflos en e l sector industrial y sus necesidades 
de financiamiento inmediato, Parte I I , Central Bank of Nicaragua, 
Managua, D.N., September 1979. 
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bread and other bakery products, the Government introduced exemptions from 
consumer taxes or provided financial assistance; and, with a view to 
increasing the inflow of foreign currency, i t is studying the possibil ity 
of increasing beef exports and promoting the domestic consumption of f ish by 
giving greater incentives to the small-scale fishery sector. 
The emergency programme for the reactivation of the economy for the 
benefit of the people provides a framework for the industrial planning of the 
nearly 120 nationalized industrial enterprises grouped together under the 
Corporación Industrial del Pueblo (People's Industrial Corporation - COIP). 
The programme includes the creation of the Ministry of Industry and the 
establishment of a financial policy, and in addition i t provides for the 
progressive participation of workers in the management of State enterprises 
and for co-operation between the private sector, the workers and the State. 
The main objectives of the programme are designed to raise the 
production of basic consumer goods and rates of emplcyment and exports to 
the highest possible levels and to rationalize imports. To this end, the 
creation of bodies responsible for promoting, co-ordinating and overseeing 
the integral application of the industrial policy has been announced. Action 
has already been initiated with a view to creating the conditions required 
for the conclusion of production agreements with large and small enterprises 
for the purpose of getting the production units bade into operation, ensuring 
adequate supplies of mass-consumption goods, building materials and basic 
inputs for industry, agriculture and mining, and promoting exports by means 
of adequate financial assistance. Finally, i t has been decided to continue 
participating in the process of Central American integration, and indeed, 
during the last quarter of 1979 the rate of exports of manufactures to the 
rest of the region showed an upward trend. 
( i v ) Construction. Within the general economic slump, the construction 
sector showed the greatest deterioration for the second year running. This 
activity, which in 1970 represented rather more than 3% of the total gross 
domestic product, accounted for less than 1% in 1979. Its growth rate 
dropped slightly in 1977 (-1.7%) and then f e l l abruptly in 1978 (-41%) and 
even more sharply in 1979 (-77%) (see table 3). 
/Construction has 
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Construction has been virtually paralyzed since the end of 1978, owing 
both to the shortage of resources in the private sector and to the financial 
position of the Government, which forced i t to reduce its investments 
drastically. The main problem, apart from the state of uncertainty produced 
among entrepreneurs by the prevailing polit ical instabi l ity, was the lack of 
capital in the financial system, which also affected the capacity of industry 
and commerce to provide building materials on credit. The deterioration 
worsened during the f i r s t half of 1979 when the construction sector was 
brought to a complete halt by the spread of the conflict to the whole country 
and especially to cities such as Managua, Leon, Estel i , Masaya and Rivas. 
Since this is a very labour-intensive sector, its paralyzation caused an 
increase in open unemployment, especially in the urban centres. Construction 
workers, unlike manual workers in the formal manufacturing sector, are 
usually hired for specific building projects and hence do not come under the 
provision adopted by the new administration making i t obligatory to pay wages 
while work is paralyzed. This was prejudicial to the income of á large sector 
of the labour force. 
In the f inal months of the year, efforts were made to create additional 
jobs, particularly in connexion with the construction of some municipal 
distribution markets (in the city of Managua) and the repair and maintenance 
of highways and bridges which had been partially destroyed during the 
fighting. Very l i t t l e was done to resume work on the construction of 
dwellings, since the immediate priority objectives were considered to be 
the recovery of the productive capacity lost during the war and the 
reconstruction of the production infrastructure, followed by urgent work of 
high social content such as the construction of low-cost housing, water 
supply and sewerage systems, schools and hospitals.19/ 
A large percentage of the activities within the. so-called "Area de 
Propiedad del Pueblo" relate to building materials industries (the cement 
industry, for example), the majority of which resumed work as soon as peace 
was restored to the country at the end of July. Although they undoubtedly 
worked below their normal production capacity, i t was possible to build up 
19/ See Programa de Emergencia y Reactivación en Beneficio del Pueblo, 
1980-1981, Ministry of Planning, 1H January 1980. 
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stocks of some basic inputs which, in the short term, were essential for 
the recovery of the construction sector. At the same time, the strong 
emphasis on the manufacture of building materials 20/ help to meet one of 
the priority objectives recently laid down by the Government, 
(v) Electric power. The total production of electric power also 
decreased substantially in 1979 (see table 6), However, during the year 
progress was made on the plan to restore and increase the generation of 
hydroelectric power, and i t proved possible to raise i t above the 1976 
production figure, the highest ever achieved in the country,21/ This is 
of paramount importance because i t was possible, especially in the f ina l 
months of the year, to replace the petroleum products used and consequently 
to make savings in foreign currency. 
Table 6 also shows figures relating to the consumption of electric 
power by types of users, which are an indirect reflection and confirmation 
of the impact of the slump on a number of economic activities already discussed. 
This is so, for example, in the case of the declines recorded in the amount 
of electricity consumed for purposes of irrigation (a partial indicator of 
agricultural activity) and for use in industry and commerce, where 
consumption had alreadjr slumped for other reasons in 1978, The deterioration 
shovm under "government, public lighting and pumping" x*as naturally less marked, 
but i t was quite pronounced in the case of household consumption, which 
represents the electricity consumed in dwellings. 
Although investment expenditure in this sector f e l l to almost half the 
figure for the preceding year, rapid progress continued to be made in the 
rural electrification project and in the implementation of the so-called 
"Ninth Master Plan", which is designed to develop the national integrated 
electric power network, 
20/ The main installations concerned include factories producing cement, 
roofing materials and gutters, blocks and paving stones, plastic pipes 
and fittings, premixed concrete, aluminium products and other building 
materials, 
21/ The share of hydroelectricity in total electric power generated was 
40% in 1976, 11% in 1977, 16% in 1978 and 45% in 1979 (24% in the . . 
f i r s t half of the year and 77% in the second), 
/In November 
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In November the Government set up the Instituto Nicaragüense de Energía 
(Nicaraguan Energy Institute - INE), which wi l l take the place of the former 
electricity agency (ENALUF) and w i l l be responsible for a l l activity in the 
country relating both to the production and generation of power and its 
distribution. INE wi l l produce the power largely distributed in the past by 
independent agencies which have now been nationalized.22/ 
( v i ) Other sectors. The activities of the other sectors also declined 
in 1979 by between 23% and 39%, the only exception being public administration 
and defence, which showed a decrease of only 2% (see table 3). Commerce 
suffered the greatest material0damage, estimated at approximately 
US$ 220 million,23/ Over 50% of that amount represents stock lost in the 
looting which occurred during the f inal month of the armed confrontation. 
Losses of financial holdings were also substantial, but in any case they 
could probably not have been collected since the situation at the end of the 
conflict was one of general insolvency. Finally, the destruction of the 
buildings, furnishings and equipment of commercial and service establishments 
resulted in losses which, although not so great as those already mentioned, 
were nevertheless considerable in urban centres such as Esteli where the most 
violent fighting occurred. 
From the very beginning the new regime promoted the work of the social 
services by a restructuring process which gives in the new Ministry of Social 
Welfare an essential role. Similarly, health and education reforms were 
initiated promptly in an attempt to raise the standard of living of the people 
as quickly as possible: this is the objective, for example, of the mass 
literacy campaign now being carried out. 
( c ) The evolution of employment and unemployment 
Because its economy is incapable of absorbing its growing labour force, 
Nicaragua has traditionally had a high rate of unemployment and underemployment. 
This situation has been getting worse since 1977 and reached abnormal 
proportions in 1979, when unemployment rose higher than 28%: twice what i t 
had been the preceding year (see table 7). 
22/ Decree No, 189 of 30 November 1979, 
23/ See Nicaragua: repercusiones económicas de los acontecimientos políticos 
recientes (E/CEPAL/G.1091). August 1979. 
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This figure corresponds to the national average, but its connotations 
are different depending on the aspect analysed - urban-rural distribution, 
regional distribution or, f ina l ly , the formal and informal labour force. 
When the armed conflict broke out, the problem of employment affected 
the urban centres and the'rural areas differently.24/ The good harvests had 
made i t possible to absorb much more manual labour in the countryside than in 
the cit ies, where at the beginning of the conflict Some activities were already 
partial ly paralyzed, with resulting unemployment. In 1979 the situation 
became worse and, unlike the preceding year, the sparce sowing of some export o 
crops made the situation with regard to rural employment as crit ical as that 
in urban centres. 
From the point of view of regional distribution, data collected in the 
last quarter of 1979 25/ indicate that in some parts of the country, such as 
Chinandega and Leon, unemployment was much higher than in others, especially 
because of the decrease in the amount of land sown with certain crops. 
Finally, the number of people employed in the informal sector rose 
during 1979 so that this more or less became the buffer sector in the midst 
of the widespread drop in economic activity,26/ accomodating those who found 
no work in the formal sectors of the economy. 
It i s possible that the problem of unemployment would have been even 
more acute i f the country had not suffered the painful loss Of so many human 
lives and i f seme of the skil led and unskilled labour had not emigrated during 
the second half of the year.27/ 
After the change of administration, the public sector was able to 
absorb part of the unemployed labour force as a result of the reorganization 
of the c iv i l and military services. However, i t should be noted that in the 
f inal months of the year, in spite of the high level of open unemployment, 
24/ See Nicaragua: Notas para e l estudio economico de America Latina, 1978 
(CEPAL/MEX/1003). February 1979. 
25/ See PREALC, Empieo en Nicaragua, situaci&n actual y lineas de accion 
futuras, November 1979. 
26/ Ibid. 
27/ According to o f f i c i a l information, however, such emigration does not 
appear to have reached particularly high levels. 
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there was some shortage of manual labour to harvest certain crops (such as 
cof fee ) , which might be partially explained by the problem of regional 
distribution mentioned above. 
In short, the employment situation became more grave in 1979 than ever 
before and has been a real challenge to the Government as regards the 
fulfilment of its goods in this respect. In order to tackle this problem, 
activities were programmed which wi l l generate employment and are necessary 
for the reconstruction or revitalization of the economy. However, these 
efforts were hindered by the disorganization and destruction of the production 
apparatus caused by the war. 
Over and above the measures provided for in the reactivation programme, 
i t was decided to create a fund to combat unemployment 28/ by promoting new 
sources of work. This fund wi l l be made up of voluntary contributions and 
levies on bonuses in excess of 1,500 c6rdobas, 
3, The external sector 
The external trade and balance-of-payments situation was already 
crit ical in 1978, when there was an increasing tendency to resort to 
international credit, especially credit from private sources with the 
consequent increase in the debt-servicing burden. The economic and polit ical 
events of 1979 seriously aggravated both the previous imbalances and the 
f l ight of capital begun in 1978, The result was a situation of total external 
insolvency and an imbalance which was not evident in the end-year current 
account because imports also decreased during 1979 owing to the paralyzation 
of productive activity. 
However, the commitments entered into previously were such that the 
magnitude of the external debt service payments which should have been made 
during the year would have prevented any attempt at economic revitalization. 
In these circumstances, payments on the external debt were suspended, and 
at the end of the year their renegotiation was begun. In spite of the 
success achieved in the renegotiation process, the situation w i l l remain 
grave, although somewhat less cr i t ica l , in the short and medium term. 




In April , the crisis had farced the previous government to raise the 
sell ing exchange rate from 7 to 10 c6rdobas per US dollar and the buying 
rate from 7 to 9 cor dob as per US dollar, although sane export products were 
excepted from this measure and a rate of 8 cordobas per US dollar was fixed 
for them. This measure, which brought about an immediate reduction in 
imported supplies, had been designed also to increase the income accruing 
to the Central Bank through the difference between the buying price and the 
amount received fron sales of foreign currency derived from exports. 
The new government established a single exchange rate of 10 cordobas 
per US dollar for a l l transactions. Nevertheless, owing to the increase in 
domestic prices, the real exchange rate f e l l markedly in the second half of 
the year (see table 8). Among the most important foreign trade policies 
applied from July 1979 onwards were those related to the nationalization of 
foreign trade through the creation of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
specialized enterprises subordinate to i t for each of the main export products 
and for other activities related to foreign relations.29/ The Ministry of 
Foreign Trade was also made responsible for co-ordinating the functions 
relating to economic integration which had previously been the responsibility 
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs . 
29/ See Decree No. 135 promulgated by the National Reconstruction Government 
Junta on 31 October 1979, establishing the system of State enterprises 
for foreign trade within the Ministry of Foreign Trade, such enterprises 
to include the Empresa Nicaragüense del Algodón (Nicaraguan Cotton 
Enterprise - ENAL), the Empresa Nicaragüense del Café (Nicaraguan Coffee 
Enterprise - ENCAFE), the Empresa Nicaragüense del Azficar (Nicaraguan 
Sugar Enterprise - ENAZUCAR), the Empresa Nicaragüense de la Carne 
(Nicaraguan Meat Enterprise - ENCAR), the Empresa Nicaragüense del Mar 
(Nicaraguan Enterprise for Marine Products - ENMAR), the Empresa 
Nicaragüense de Alimentos Básicos (Nicaraguan Basic Foodstuffs Enterprise-
ENABAS), the Empresa Nicaragüense de Insumos Agropecuarios (Nicaraguan 
Agricultural Inputs Enterprise - ENIA), the Empresa Nicaragüense del 
Banano (Nicaraguan Banana Enterprise - BANANIC) and the Empresa 
Nicaragüense del Petróleo (Nicaraguan Petroleum Enterprise - PETRONIC). 
/(a) Trade 
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^ Trade in goods 
( i ) Exports. After remaining almost constant in 1978, the value of 
exports f e l l by rather more than 12% in 1979 to US$ 570 million, which was 
only slightly higher than in 1976 (see table 9), Approximately 70% of this 
amount was derived from exports made in the f i r s t half of the year as a 
result of the then Government's efforts to accelerate the generation of 
foreign currency and maintain a minimum level of international liquidity. 
This contributed indirectly to the f l ight of foreign currency, as evidenced 
by the advance sale of meat, the United States import quota for which was 
almost f i l l ed in the f i r s t part of the year. This increase in sales had a 
detrimental effect on the rational exploitation of the country's cattle, 
although i t did make i t possible to benefit from the rise in meat prices on 
the international market. 
As already noted, the value of sales of cotton, x-ihich had been the main 
export product up to 1976, f e l l by nearly 4% because the 6% rise in the 
international price of cotton was not enough to make up for the-. drop in the 
volume exported. 
As regards coffee, whose export value dropped by more than 20% in 1978, 
i t is very likely that had the plantations not been neglected by the producers 
there would have been a record crop and sales of coffee would have increased 
markedly. 
Among the other traditional export products, the value of sugar exports 
remained the same while the value of shrimp and lobster exports rose by 29%. 
The performance of sugar was due to the fact that the rise in the 
international price of that product made up for the 8% decrease in the volume 
exported. The rise in the value of shrimp and lobster exports occurred in 
spite of the 19% decline in the volume exported, which was more than offset 
by a rise of nearly 60% in the international prices. Although this produced 
a large increase in the current value of exports of shrimp and lobster, the 
value was nevertheless much lower than in 1977. 
Finally, sales of chemicals, most of which go to the Central American 
market, f e l l by 42%. This drop was due mainly to the limited supply caused by 
the paralysis of the country's activities but also partly to a decrease in the 
demand in other Central American countries, such as El Salvador, where domestic 
activity was also affected. 
/ ( i i ) Imports. 
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( i i ) Imports. The total value of imports amounted to nearly 
US$ 360 million, which was 40% lower than in 1978, when imports had fal len in 
turn by 22% in comparison with 1977. Thus, the volume imported in 1979 was 
only the same as that achieved 17 years previously (see table 10). 
The value of external sales of intermediate goods f e l l by 36% while 
those of imports of consumer and capital goods dropped by 41% and 49%, 
respectively. The decline in sales of intermediate goods, excluding petroleum, 
however, was much greater i f the fact that sales of fuels f e l l by only 10% 
is taken into consideration. 
The very marked drop in imports, together with the very open nature of 
the Nicaraguan economy, meant that the inadequacy of external supply was a 
great obstacle to reactivation. 
( i i i ) The terms of trade and the purchasing power of exports. The drop 
in the volume exported was nearly 15%, but its impact was partial ly attenuated 
by the rise of nearly 3% in the prices of exports. On the other hand, the 
consequences of the drop in imports were aggravated by the rise of 
approximately 15% in their unit prices. For this reason, the terms of trade 
deteriorated markedly for the second year running (see table 11), so that 
the pronounced slump in the economy caused by internal factors was made worse 
by the unfavourable consequences of a downward turn in the external variables. 
As a result, the purchasing power of exports, which had been quite high in 1977, 
f a l l by 8% in 1978 and by 23% in 1979 (see table 11). 
^k) Trade in services and factor payments 
Unlike the trade in goods, in which a positive balance was achieved, 
the balance on the trade in services was again negative, the deficit being 
almost three times as great as the one recorded the preceding year 
(see table 12). Part of the blame for this undoubtedly lay with the new rise 
in the price of fuels , which contributed greatly to the rise in freight rates; 
the virtual absence of income from tourism, and the outflow of foreign 
currency connected with the departure of groups of Nicaraguans who moved out 
of the country during the most cr it ical periods in the conflict. 
Net payments of profits and interest f e l l from US$ 94 million to 




(c ) The balance on current account and its financing 
During 1979, there was a favourable balance on current account of 
US$ 84 million whereas in 1978 there had been a deficit of US$ 33 million. 
The crit ical situation due to the level of external indebtedness9 which would 
ordinarily have made i t necessary to make high amortization payments in 1979, 
was relieved by the suspension of these payments. Moreover, the 
international co-operation extended during the second half of the year in the 
form of donations and new loans on more favourable terms than before placed 
the country in a somewhat easier external finance position in the f ina l months 
of the year as far as immediate commitments were concerned. Finally, the net 
international reserves rose by rather more than US$ 50 million. 
External indebtedness 
In December 1979 the medium-and long-term disbursed external public 
debt amounted to nearly US$ 1,160, over 20% higher than the preceding year. 
Up to August this debt was slightly more than US$ 960 million. However, i f 
the short-term commitments existent at that time and the indebtedness of 
the private sector are taken into account, the total debt was over 
US$ 1,530 million. According to o f f i c i a l estimates, the total debt at the 
end of 1979 came to about US$ 1,600 million. 
In order to make the amortization and interest payments on the amount 
owing, i t would have been necessary to pay out move than 100% of the foreign 
currency obtained from ejqports of goods and services, which was clearly 
impossible. In fact , the medium- and long-term public external debt 
servicing was reduced from US$ 103 million to US$ 80 million by cutting 
interest and amortization payments to the bare minimum. As a result , debt 
servicing as a percentage of the value of exports f e l l from 13.4% in 1978 
to 12.7% in 1979 (see table 13). 
4. Prices and wages 
Prices and anti-inflation policy 
The rise of slightly more than 4% in prices in 1978 was fa i r ly moderate 
by comparison with the rises recorded in the other Central American countries. 
This was due primarily to the excellent harvests obtained that year and to 




However, this relative stabil ity in prices changed radically in 1979. 
The day after the April devaluation, the price of fuels rose by approximately 
50% and that of medicines by between 40% and 50%. In addition, 
authorization was given for increases in electric power, telecommunications, 
postal and drinking water rates. Although measures were adopted to control 
the prices of some basic products, shortages of these, hoarding, and other 
repercussions of the intensification of the armed conflict cuased a widespread 
and unprecedented rise in domestic prices, which climbed by over 84% during 
the f i r s t half of the year. 
This trend was reversed when the new government came into power, partly 
because it was sought from the beginning to freeze the prices of a few basic 
items through State intervention, partly because of a relative improvement 
in the food supply situation, and partly because of the donations in kind 
received. Thus, during the second half of the year, prices f e l l by about 8%. 
Nevertheless, the variation between December 1978 and the same month in 1979 
for the general consumer price index in Managua came to 70.3%, while the food 
sub-index nearly doubled.30/ The annual average variation in consumer prices 
was 48.5%, with a larger variation (63.3%) for food, beverages and tobacco 
(see table 14). 
The new authorities adopted measures to control prices, especially 
food prices, through agencies such as the Nicaraguan Basic Food Enterprise 
and people's organizations which were given responsibility for looking out 
for and reporting irregularities. Even so, however, there were s t i l l 
middlemen who, despite the severe penalties introduced by the Government, 
continued to speculate in certain essential items. The Emergency Reactivation 
Programme is designed to check such speculation through marketing machinery 
and price policies embodied in a scheme for meeting the basic consumer needs 
of the population. 
The Government also adopted f i sca l measures to prevent consumer taxes 
from having a significant impact on goods related to productive activities 
and mass consumption, directing them instead to items such as wines, liquors 
30/ The monthly variations during the year were as follows: January, 1.2%; 
February, 0.7%; March, 2.3%; April, 12.5%; May, 7.5%; June, 43.0%; 
July, 2.2%; August, -12.2%; September, 2.6%; October, 0.0%; November, 
-0.1% and December'2.7%. 
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and gasoline for motor vehicles, which are acquired by people with more 
resources at their disposal. To the same end, the taxes on some basic 
consumer products were removed. Thus, the selective tax of 20% on wheat 
f lour and 30% on unmilled wheat and spelt were eliminated, and the taxes on 
alcoholic beverages were raised by an average of 50%. 
Finally, in December a law regulating the rental of dwellings was 
promulgated and went into effect on 1 January 1980. A 40% to 50% reduction 
of the lowest rents was decreed and an annual limit of 5% of the o f f i c ia l 
valuation of dwellings was imposed fo r those in excess of 1,000 cordobas in 
Managua and 500 cSrdobas in the rest of the country, 
(b ) Wages and salaries 
After remaining relatively stable during the period 1975-1978, real 
wages and salaries f e l l by around 17% in 1979 31/ (see table 15). This drop 
was largely attributable to the accelerated increase in prices, especially 
food prices, which took place during the f i r s t half of the year. 
To compensate for the effects of the devaluation, the previous Government 
decreed a wage adjustment effective 1 May for public employees. The scale 
of readjustments ranged from 10% to 25%, and the private sector was also 
recommended to conform to i t . These rises did not, however, succeed in making 
up for the loss in the purchasing power of wages and salaries. 
One of the f i r s t measures adopted by the new government was to make i t 
obligatory to pay the wages and salaries due for the period in which activities 
had been paralyzed in both the public and private sectors. It was thus 
possible to maintain at least a minimum level of real demand by wage earners, 
although at the same time the pay involved constituted an additional obstacle 
for small production units, many of which were in serious financial d i f f icu lt ies . 
The government maintained the minimum wages previously established and 
set a maximum limit of 10,000 c6rdobas a month on the salaries of public 
o f f ic ia l s and administrators. It also adopted a new minimum wage scale for 
31/ It must be borne in mind that the figures given are for the wages and 
salaries of personnel covered by the Nicaraguan Social Security 
Institute, which does not include a high percentage of the labour force. 
These figures may, however, serve as an indicator of the evolution of 
wages and salaries of the formal labour force or, at least, of those 




both permanent and seasonal rural workers by geographical area and type of 
work, especially for coffee plantation workers, which includes their board 
and lodging. These provisions are aimed at reducing the disparity between 
minimum and maximum wages and at least keeping the real wages of the lower 
income groups of the population at the same level. However, for the purpose 
of reactivating the economy and creating new jobs, a relatively cautious wage 
policy was followed while emphasis was placed on other kinds of measures, 
such as the provision of services and the setting of price ceilings on basic 
items, in an attempt to improve in the short term the well-being of those 
groups making up the majority of the population. This policy was partly 
responsible for some work stoppages during the second-half of •.•the year, .and 
demands for additional wage hikes and Christmas bonuses continued. However, 
the policy of the trade unions and workers' organizations, such as the Central 
Sandinista de Trabajadores (Sandinista Workers' Organization - CST) and the 
Asociación de Trabajadores del Campo (Rural Workers' Association - ATC) focused 
more on social welfare issues, especially those relating to working conditions, 
than on wage increases, and sought to co-ordinate action with the Government's 
employment and wage policies and those relating to the ownership of the means 
of production. Some public employees and workers resolved through their 
organizations to give up their Christmas bonus (''thirteenth month") to 
demonstrate their solidarity with the Government in its attempts to deal with 
its financial limitations. 
Unemployment affected a very high percentage of the labour force, who 
received no income during much of the year. This, in conjunction with the 
deterioration in real wages due to the price r ises, meant that wages and 
salaries as a whole must have dropped more markedly than the total value 
added, although the present administration is trying to correct this trend. 
Under the emergency reactivation programme for the benefit of the 
people, a wage policy is being applied which is aimed at ensuring a minimum 
level of consumption for a l l wage earners and at e>5)anding social benefits 
(health, education and housing). For this purpose, price controls have begun 
to be applied with a view to raising the standard of living of the population 
/and the 
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and the above-mentioned decree which came into effect in January providing 
for a reduction in the rent of dwellings has also helped to improve the 
purchasing power of non-manual and manual workers. 
5. Monetary and f iscal policy 
(a) Monetary policy 
The economic crisis rendered the monetary and financial system 
increasingly vulnerable and made it less feasible to use that system for 
effecting positive changes in the levels of economic activity. As the 
political crisis got worse, i t became more di f f icult to co-ordinate action 
and measures in the various fields of economic policy, including the monetary 
and financial f ie lds. Moreover, as the armed conflict stepped up, economic 
development objectives were replaced by other objectives of greater 
importance for the interests of the group which held the political power, 
among them being the withdrawal of capital from the country. Thus, i f any 
consistency was observable in the application of the financial and credit 
policy within the tremendous limitations imposed by the extreme drop in 
liquidity which had been taking place, i t was in the co-ordinated action 
taken to faci l itate the attainment of certain objectives diametrically 
opposed to national interests. 
Since the change of administration took place in the middle of the year, 
i t seems appropriate to recall the monetary and financial, situation which the 
country was in when the new government took over. 
During the f i rst part of the year, the financial variables were 
influenced f i rs t by the economic slump and cessation of activities, which 
had weakened the public finances, secondly, by the f l ight of capital which, 
together with the loss of capital from the banking system, made the position 
of the monetary and financial system extremely critical in the middle of the 
year, and thirdly by the very high rate of inflation combined with the effects 
of the devaluation and the speculation in or looting of various products, 
especially foodstuffs. 
As may be observed in table 16, the rapid crop in the supply of quasi-
money begun in 1978 continued in 1979. Savings and time deposits decreased 
by over 130 million córdobas, while sight deposits rose by almost 200 million 
córdobas. Moreover, the Government's use of domestic credit, especially to the 
/prejudice of 
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prejudice of credit for other productive activit ies, continued to increase 
rapidly» Thus, of the 440 million cordobas by which credit increased 
during the f i r s t half of the year, 421 million cordobas consisted of credit 
to the central government, whereas credit to the private sector decreased by 
137 million cordobas. 
Because of the debt-servicing commitments, only a minimum of which 
were met, and above a l l because of the fac i l i ty accorded to the f l ight of 
foreign currency, in June there was a marked decline in the net international 
reserves, which had already shown a deficit of nearly 1,300 million cSrdobas 
in December 1978. This crit ical situation as regards external solvency arose 
in spite of the fact that total long-term external loans and loans granted 
by the federal reserve system of the United States had increased by more than 
200 million cSrdobas. 
In view of the need to adopt decisions to expedite the initiation of 
reconstruction and revitalization in July, steps were taken to refinance 
the debt. Thanks in part to international assistance and the domestic 
policy of centralizing and stabilizing the financial system, during the 
rest of the year a more adequate level of reserves could be maintained. 
Because of this , a good deal more money was issued, while at the same time 
the expansion of domestic credit was faci l itated with a view to promoting 
economic revitalization.32/ Even so, however, since the situation as regards 
the monetary variables was so .critical at the beginning, big imbalances were 
s t i l l observable at the end of the year. 
The principal measures in this area of economic policy included the 
nationalization of the financial system, which met with great di f f iculty owing 
to the insolvency inherited from the previous regime;33/ the creation of the 
32/ During the f i r s t half of the year, the money supply rose by 18% and 
domestic credit to the public sector increased by 54%, while domestic 
credit to the private sector f e l l by -4%. During the second half of 
the year, a l l these variables increased by 50%, 72% and 23%, respectively. 
33/ Decree No. 25 of 26 July 1979 and Supplement.:ary Dccree No., 90 of 
21 September 1979. 
/Governing Council 
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Governing Council of the National Financial System;34/ the nationalization of 
insurance and reinsurance companies, and the creation of the Nicaraguan 
Insurance and Reinsurance Institute.35/ 
Owing to the lack of liquidity and in an attempt to amplify and 
reorient the possibi l it ies of credit expansion, a law entitled "Ley de 
Defensa de la Maneda Nacional" (Law to Uphold the National Currency) 36/ was 
promulgated making i t obligatory to deposit b i l l s of 1,000 and 500 cordobas 
within a mandatory period of 180 days. 
The monetary policy adopted by the new government seeks to faci l i tate 
reactivation, especially by reconstituting the working capital both of the 
so-called "Area de Propiedad del Pueblo" and of the other activit ies, 
particularly those engaged in the production of essential goods, 
(b ) Fiscal policy 
The public finances had been deteriorating to an increasing extent 
since the beginning of the decade, since i t was necessary to pay for the 
major part of the expenditure with external credit, which resulted in a 
substantial increase in the external debt. The contraction in economic 
activity which began during 1978 reduced the Government's tax revenues that 
year and even more so in 1979. This trend was reflected in a growing f i sca l 
deficit both in absolute and relative terms 37/ (see table 17). However, 
as the country gradually lost part of its international financial support, 
i t became increasingly d i f f icu l t to finance the expenditure by contracting 
external debts, and even more so as the internal confrontation increased and 
the precariousness of the Government became apparent. 
34/ Decree No. 136 of 3 October 1979 and Supplementary Decree No. 254 
of 27 December 1979. 
35/ Decree No. 107 of 16 October 1979. 
36/ Decree No. 55 of 24 August of 1979 and Supplementary Decree Ho. 201 of 
12 December 1979. 
37/ The f i sca l deficit was equivalent to 43% of the current income in 
1976, 71% in 1977 and 92% in 1978. 
/The current 
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The current income of the Government in the f i r s t half of 1979 amounted 
to 675 million cordobas: approximately 15% more than in the same period in 
1978. Factors in this increase included the obligation to present a 
certificate of f iscal solvency in order to complete a large number of 
formalities, the different exchange rates for buying and selling foreign 
currency which were set at the same time as the April devaluation, and the 
obligation to make an advance deposit equivalent to 100% of the value of 
imports ordered. 
During the f i r s t half of the year, the consumption of capital goods 
and the purchase of goods and non-personal services decreased substantially 
while payments of wages and salaries increased and the payment of interest 
on the public debt rose markedly.38/ Thus, the deficit in respect of the 
f i r s t half of the year amounted to 337 million c&rddbas, 44% of current 
income. Although this represented an improvement over 1978, at the end of 
July i t was obvious that the f ina l results of the 1979 exercise, too, were 
bound to be extremely bad.39/ 
This deficit constituted one of the main restrictive elements affecting 
the economy, and during the second half of the year the new Government did 
a l l i t could to attenuate i t . Among the measures adopted to increase 
revenues were the following: ( i ) the law on tax settlements, which set 
specific time limits for the settlement of tax l i ab i l i t ies ; 40/ ( i i ) the 
introduction of new taxes on activities where collection is quick and easy, 
such as the export of bananas,41/ and progressive ad valorem taxes on coffee 
38/ In the f i r s t half of 1979, in comparison with the same period in 1978, 
wages and salaries rose by 17%, the purchase of goods and personal 
services f e l l by 37%, current transfers dropiped by 17%, the interest 
on the public debt rose by 127% and capital expenditure f e l l by 38%. 
39/ CEPAL, Repercusiones económicas de los acontecimientos políticos 
recientes, op. cit . 
40/ Decree-Law No. 120 of 23 October 1979. 
41/ See the provision of 9 October 1979 establishing a tax of US$ 0.50 on 
each 40-pound box exported, which came close to the commitment entered 
into by members of the Union of Banana-Exporting Countries (UPEB). 
/and sesame; 
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and sesame;42/ ( i i i ) the replacement of the fixed tax on the consumption of 
tobacco and alcoholic beverages by an ad valorem tax; ( iv ) the provision 
authorizing the advance exchange of non-negotiable special term deposit 
certificates i f given to the tax authorities in lieu of tax payments;43/ 
(v ) the reintroduction of the certificate of f iscal solvency;44/ and (v i ) an 
increase in the gasoline tax.45/ 
These measures made i t possible to raise current income by 4.4% in 1979, 
contrary to what had been predicted in August in an evaluation of the economic 
repercussions of the political events following the country's return to 
peaceful conditions. 
On the other hand a great effort was made to rationalize the 
expenditure by means of budgetary controls, as shown by the fact that no 
time was lost in formulating an emergency budget for the last quarter 
October-December 1979. 
Current expenditure, for its part, rose by 20% from 1,980 million 
cördobas in 1978 to 2,330 in 1979, basically because of an 87% rise in 
wage payments due in large measure to the incorporation of a large number 
of of f icials in the central government as a consequence of the increased 
number of tasks which have now been undertaken. 
Nevertheless, the measures to increase revenues and control expenditure 
made i t possible to attenuate the serious f iscal situation only slightly. 
The current account deficit was the highest in the country's history, and 
the only reason why the total f i sca l deficit was no higher than 10% of the 
gross domestic product was because investment expenditure was resumed only 
slowly.46/ The seriousness of the situation was also reflected in the large 
42/ Decree No. 84 of 19 September 1979 and Decree No. 157 of 5 November 1979 
establishing progressive ad valorem taxes on exports of coffee and 
sesame, respectively. 
43/ Gaceta No. 14 of 20 September 1979; Decree No. 69 of 13 September 1979. 
44/ Decree No. 164 of 17 November 1979 establishing that this document is 
required for administrative and legal formalities. 
45/ Decree No. 104 of 6 October 1979. 
46/ Capital expenditure f e l l by 32% during the year, the decrease being 20% 
in real investment but 83% in debt amortization payments. It should be 
noted that the central government paid 65 million cördobas in amortization 
payments in 1979, whereas in August, before renegotiation, i t had been 




domestic debt incurred by the public sector with financial intermediaries 
(see table 16), In connexion with this cr it ical situation, i t should be 
pointed out that the public sector has assumed the ownership of a large 
percentage of the productive areas of the country, whose surpluses might in 
the near future help to finance the public sector and the central government 
with the aim of achieving the goals which the Government has set i t se l f as 
regards the development of a more equalitarian society. 
Table 1 
NICARAGUA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979(a) 
Basic economic ind ica tors 
Grcss domestic product at f a c t o r cost 
U U l i o n s o f do l l a r s at 1970 p r i c e s ) 996 1 018 1 069 1 136 1 055 793 
Population (m i l l i ons of inhabi tants ) 2.24 2.32 2.40 2.48 2.56 2.64 
Per capita gross domestic product 
( d o l l a r s at 1970 p r i c es ) 444 439 446 459 412 300 
Growth rates 
Short-run economic ind icators 
Gross domestic product 12.7 2 .2 5.0 6.3 -7 .2 -24.8 
Per capita gross domestic product 9.0 -1 .1 1 . 6 2.8 -10.2 -27 .2 
Gross income (b ) 12.1 -2 .6 10.0 13.6 -9 .7 -25.7 
Terms o f trade -4 .3 19.1 21.9 33.3 -13.6 -10.3 
Current value o f exports o f goods 
and serv ices 29.1 1.1 36.6 17.5 5.2 -18.1 
Current value o f imports o f goods 
and serv ices 56.2 - 9 . 2 - 41.9 -17 .2 -30.9 
Consumer pr i ce index 
December - December • • • 1.9 6.2 10.2 4.3 70.3 
Var iat ion between annual averages • • • 1.8 2.9 11.4 4.6 48.5 
Money 11.8 - 3 . 5 25.4 6.2 5.1 76.8 
Wages and sa la r i e s ( c ) 16.8 5.8 5.0 9.6 4.5 22.7 
Rate of unemployment (d ) 6.1 9.6 8.7 ; 3 . i 14.5, 2C.4 
Current income o f governemt 45.7 - 3 . 1 15.4 17.6 -7 .7 4.4 
Tota l expenditure of government 27.0 3.9 4.3 41.2 3.4 -6 .6 
F i sca l d e f i c i t / t o t a l expenditure 
of government (d ) 32.6 37.2 29.9 41.7 47.9 41; 8 
M i l l i ons o f d o l l a r s 
External sector 
Trade balance (goods and s e r v i c e s ) -214 -148 19 -125 60 140 
Balance on current account -267 -195 -47 -192 -33 84 
Var iat ion in net in ternat iona l reserves -28 38 -8 4 -88 -52 
External debt ( e ) 503 644 681 912 961 1 159 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis o f o f f i c i a l data. 
Ta) Prel iminary f i g u r e s . 
(b ) Gross domestic product plus tenns-o f - t rade e f f e c t . 
( c ) Nominal wages and sa l a r i e s o f members o f the Nicaraguan Social Security I n s t i t u t e . 
( d ) Percentage. 
( e ) Disbursed.public anc State-guaranteed external debt . 

Table 339 
, NICARAGUA : TOTAL SUPPLÌ AND DEMAND 
Millions of córdobas Percentage 
at 1970 priccs breakdown Growth rates 
1977 1978 1979(a) 1970 1979(a) 1977 1978 1979(a) 
Total supply 10 876 9 630 6 956 129.2 125.3 12.3 -11.5 -27.8 
Gross domestic product at 
market prices 7 954 7 385 5 553 100.0 100.0 6.3 -7.2 -24.8 
Imports of goods and 
services (b) 2 922 2 245 1 403 29.2 25.3 32.5 -23.2 -37.5 
Total demand 10 876 9 630 6 956 129.2 125.3 12.3 -11.5 -27.8 
Domestic demand 8 886 7 437 5 271 102.5 94.9 20.2 - m -29.1 
Gross domestic investment 2 070 841 -256 18.6 -4.6 74.8 -59.3 • • 4 
Gross fixed investment 1 681 938 395 16.4 7.1 28.2 -44.2 -57.9 
Construction 709 416 97 6.5 1.7 -1.6 -41.3 -76.7 
Machinery 972 521 298 9.9 5.4 64.4 -46.4 -42.8 
Public 841 423 190 4.2 3-4 57.3 -49.7 -55.0 
Private 840 515 204 12.2 3-7 8.1 -38.7 -60.4 
Changes in stocks 388 -96 -651 2.2 -11.7 
Total consumption 6 816 6 596 5 527 83.9 99.5 9.8 -32 -16.2 
General government 902 1 110 1 035 9.6 18.6 12.4 23.1 -6.7 
Private 5 914 5 486 4 492 74.3 80.9 9.4 -7.2 -18.1 
Exports of goods and 
services (b) 1 991 2 193 1 686 26.7 30.4 -13.4 10.1 -23.1 
Source: 1970-1:579: CEFAL calculations on the basis oT figures supplied by the Central Bank of 
Nicaragua. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) The figures for exports and imports of goods and services were taken from balance-of-payments 
data expressed in dollars at current pri.ces, which were converted to constant 1970 values by 
deflation, using price indexes csiculcited by CEPAL for the purpose« 
Table 3 
NICARAGUA: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY KIND OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, AT FACTOR COST 
Millions of córdobas Percentage 
at 1970 prices breakdown Growth rates 
1977 1978 1979(a) 1970 1979(a) 1977 1978 1979(a) 
Agriculture 1 875 1 996 1 737 27.0 33.5 3.6 6.5 -13.0 
Mining 18 14 18 0.7 0.3 -3-7 -22.3 26.8 
Manufacturing 1 425 1 424 1 035 19.2 20.0 7.8 -0.1 -27.3 
Construction 373 219 51 3.5 1.0 -1.7 -41.3 -76.7 
Subtotal goods 3 691 3 653 2 841 50.3 54.8 M -1.0 -22.2 
Electricity, gas and water 174 161 158 1.7 3.0 12.4 -7.4 -2.0 
Transport, storage and 
communications 421 310 263 5.8 5.1 7.6 -19.3 -22.6 
Subtotal basic services 595 501 421 7.5 hi 9.0 -15.8 -16.0 
Commerce, financial institutions 
and insurance 1 529 1 326 808 20.5 15.6 8.0 -13.2 -39.1 
Real estate (b) 364 328 218 7.1 4.2 4.6 -9.8 -33.4 
Community, social and personal 
services (c) 1 094 1 014 893 14.6 17.2 7.8 -7.3 -12.0 
Subtotal other services 2 987 2 668 1 919 42.2 37.0 7.5 -10.6 -28.1 
Gross dociiistic product (d) 7 282 6 761 5 084 100.0 100.0 6.3 -7.2 -24.8 
So urge: 1970-1979: CEPAL. calculations on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Bank of 
Nicaragua. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) Ownership of dwellings only. 
(c) Also includes restaurants, hotels and business services. 
(d) As the individual activities and the totals were calculated independently, the sum of the 
former does not correspond exactly with the latter. 
Table 4 
NICARAGUA: INDICATORS OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Growth rates (b) 
1976 1977 1978 1979(a) 
1977 1978 1979(a) 
Index of agricultural production 
(1970 s 100) 118.7 152.9 163.6 144.0 2.8 7, .0 -12.0 
Production of main crops 
(millions of quintals) 
Export crops 
Ginned cotton 2 137 2 586 2 621 1 975 6.1 1, .3 -24.7 
Cotton seed 3 922 4 208 4 296 3 243 7.3 2. ,1 -24.5 
Green cof fee 1 109 1 222 1 25* 1 361 10.3 2 . ,6 8.6 
Sugar cane 56.9 54.9 56.* 58.2 -3.6 2. .8 3.2 
Bananas 3 «18 3 533 3 77* 5 500 2.5 6. .8 45.7 
Sesame 76 101 126 375 32.8 25. .1 197.6 
Havana tobacco 23 26 29 29 11.6 12. .0 
Crops for domestic consumption 
Maize 4 371 3 942 5 525 3 750 -9.8 40. .2 -32.1 
Beans 1 177 895 1 206 862 -24.0 34. .8 -28.5 
Hulled rice 925 994 1 238 937 7.5 24, .5 -24.3 
Sorghui 1 225 970 1 318 1 071 -20.8 35. .8 -18.7 
Blond tobacco 35 37 « 32 4.8 12. .7 -22.2 
Indicators of stock-raising production 
Number of animals slaughtered 
Cattle (c ) 370 389 482 448 5.2 23. .7 -7.1 
Pigs (c ) 311 280 237 200 -10.0 -15. .3 -15.6 
Poultry (d) 13 15 16 10 14.7 6. 7 -37.5 
Changes in stocks 
Cattle ( c ) 55 81 13 -62 • • • • « • 
Pigs ( c ) 36 48 48 • • • t , • • • 
Poultry ( e ) 178 180 180 150 • • • , , • • • 
Other indicators 
Milk production ( f ) 118 118 119 99 0.2 0 . ,6 -16.9 
Egg production ( g ) 33 35 3T 25 6.1 7. .1 -33.3 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of figures supplied by the Central Sank of Nicaragua. 
T a ) Preliminary f igures. 
(b) The growth rates were calculated on the b£3is of real , not rounded figures. 
( c ) Thousands of head. 
(d) Millions of pounds. 
( e ) Thousands of chickens includes 1 million chickens imported in 1978 and 6 Bi l l ion in 1979. 
( f ) Millions of gallons. 
( g ) Millions of dozens. 
Table 5 
NICARAGUA: INDICATORS OF MANUFACTURING PBODUCTION 
Millions of córdobas 
at 1958 prices Growth rates (b) 
1976 1977 1978 1979(a) 1977 1978 1979(a) 
Talue of total production 454 3 715 3 714 2 692 7. ,6 -0.1 
¥75 
-27.5 
- T O Food 1 l»65 1 554 1 629 1 336 6.1 
Beverages 222 286 291 202 28. .5 2.0 -30.5 
Tobacco 100 107 104 74 7. .2 -3.0 -28.3 
Texti les 187 177 172 ICS -5. 13 "3.2 -37.3 
Footwear and clothing 100 98 85 48 -1, ,9 -13.1 -43.3 
Wood and cork 116 124 99 50 6. .7 -20.1 -49.6 
Furniture and accessories 21 22 22 15 8. .7 -2.2 -31.5 
Paper and paper products 75 85 94 56 14, .3 10.4 -40.3 
Printing, publishing and 
related Industries 54 61 50 37 13. .2 -17.4 -26.6 
Leather and leather products 22 23 26 21 4, .5 12.6 -18.1 
Rubber products 10 11 11 8 10, . 1 1.8 -25.2 
Chemicals and chemical products 507 538 544 377 6. ,2 1.1 -30.7 
Petroleum products 142 153 127 127 7. .4 -17.2 -0.1 
Non-metallic minerals 162 174 148 69 7, .1 -14.8 -53.6 
Metal products 146 173 178 87 18. .9 2.6 -50.8 
Electrical and non-electrical 
machinery 51 52 53 28 1 .6 2.7 -47.6 
Transport equipment 12 f l 11 7 -7 .0 3-7 -40.5 
Others 61 65 69 41 5, .9 5.5 -40.2 
Other Indicators 
Industrial consumption of 
e lectr ic i ty (millions of kWh) • . . 258 261 194 1.2 -25.7 
Employment (thousands of workers) 30.5 32.0 31.0 26.7 5. ,0 -3.2 -13.8 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of data supplied by the Centra' Sank of Nicaragua. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) Growth rates based on real, not rounded figures. 
Table 6 
NICARAGUA: ELECTRICITY INDICATORS 
M i l l i o n s of k i lowat t hours Gr •owth rates (b ) 
1976 1977 1978 1979(a) 1977 1978 1979(a) 
Gross generation of power 
by type of s ta t i on 949 1 073 1 072 868 13.1 -0 .1 -19.1 
H id ro - e l e c t r i c 380 120 176 392 - ÏÔ .2 45.9 122.6 
Thermal 541 899 876 465 66.2 -2 .5 -46.9 
Diese l and gas 28 54 20 11 88.8 -63.2 -47.0 
Consumption according to use 796 882 886 729 10.9 0.4 -17.4 
I r r i g a t i o n 54 58 48 37 7.7 -16.3 -23.9 
Industry 290 309 308 227 6 . ; - 0 . 3 -26 .2 
Commerce ( c ) 222 249 247 213 12.2 -1 .1 -13.5 
Government, publ ic l i g h t i n g 
-5 .8 and pumping 89 103 114 107 19.2 10.1 
Household 143 163 169 145 13.8 3.7 -14 .2 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis o f data supplied by the Central Bank of Nicaragua and the I n s t i tu t o 
Nicaragüense de Energía (Nicaraguan Energy Ins t i tu t e - INE) , 
( a ) Prel iminary f i g u r e s . 
(b ) Growth rates based on r e a l , not rounded f i g u r e s . 
( c ) Includes "commercial" and "who lesa le " , consumption, as designated in INE s t a t i s t i c s . 
Table 7 
NICARAGUA: EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
1976 1977 1978 1979(a) 
Rates of unemployment 
National 8 .7 (b ) 13.1 (c ) .14.5(d) 28 .4 ( c ) 
Agr icu l tura l a c t i v i t i e s ( e ) . . . 15.8(c ) . . . 32 .1 ( c ) 
Non-agr icul tural a c t i v i t i e s ( f ) . . . 11.4(c ) . . . 25 .7 ( c ) 
Managua 9 .8 (b ) 5 .8 (b ) . . . 24 .6 (g ) 
Indexes (1976 = 100) 
Economically a c t i v e population 
(na t i ona l ) 100.0 104.3 108.0 110.3 
Unemployment ( na t i ona l ) (h ) 100.0 157.8 181.2 360.9 
Employment ( na t i ona l ) (h ) 100.0 99.3 101.0 86.5 
Employment (members o f the Nicaraguan 
Soc ia l Security I n s t i t u t e ) 100.0 107.0 106.5 90.4 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis o f data supplied by the Ministry o f Planning, the Central Bank and 
other o f f i c i a l sources. 
( a ) Prel iminary f i g u r e s . 
(b ) Based on the employment survey conducted by the Surveys and Census Bureau in the areas o f 
Chinandega, León, Masaya, Granada, J inotepe, Diriamba, Rivas and Managua. 
( c ) Ministry o f Planning; "Programa de Emergencia y Reactivación en Bene f i c i o del Pueblo, 
1980-1981", "Afio de la A l f abe t i z a c i ón " , 14 January 1980, table I I - 9 - 1 , p. 111. 
(d ) CEPAL, "Nicaragua: Repercusiones económicas de los acontecimientos r e c i en t e s " , E/CEPAL/G. 
1091, August 1979. Estimate based on assumption that per capita product i v i t y of workers 
remains constant. 
( e ) Includes a g r i c u l t u r a l , f o r e s t r y , f i she r y and mining sec tors . 
( f ) includes manufacturing, construct ion, commerce and other s e r v i c e s . 
( g ) Regional employment Programme f o r Lat in America and the Caribbean (PREALC), Empleo en 
Nicaragua: Situación actual y l ineas de acción futuras, issued in November 1979 and based on 
a survey conducted in October 1979. 
(h ) Estimated on the basis o f the rate of nat ional unemployment shown in the f i r s t l i n e on th i s 
t ab l e . 
( i ) Estimated on the basis o f data supplied by the Central Bank of Nicaragua on the membership o f 
the Nicaraguan Soc ia l Securi ty I n s t i t u t e . 
Table 8 























































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis o f o f f i c i a l data, 
( a ) On 7 Apr i l the cordoba was devalued from 7 to 10 per 
d o l l a r s . 
Table 9 
NICARAGUA: EXPORTS OF GOODS, FOB 
Percentage .. 
M i l l i ons of d o l l a r s breakdown (b ) Growth rates ( b ) 
1976 1977 1978 1979(a) 1970 1979(a) 1977 1978 1979(a) 
Main-tradi t ional exports 361 437 444 426 60.8 75.1 21.1 1.6 - 4 . 1 
Cotton 131 151 141 135 19.1 23.8 15.3 -6 .4 - 3 . 9 
Co f f ee 119 199 200 158 18.0 27.9 66.5 0.4 -20.6 
Sugar 53 28 20 20 5.5 3.5 -47.3 -29.6 - 0 . 3 
Meat 38 37 68 94 14.9 16.6 -0 .9 81.7 38.6 
Shrimp and l obs t e r 20 22 15 19 3.4 3.3 11,6 -33.2 28.8 
Main non-tradi t ional exports 59 66 70 • • • 7.7 • • • 11.9 6.1 ... 
Bananas 5 4 5 6 0.2 1.1 -2 .8 7.3 32.7 
Unmanufactured tobacco 5 4 5 • • • 1.1 , , , -8 .5 13.9 ... 
Chemical products 42 51 52 30 5.3 5.3 22.7 2.3 -41.9 
Dairy products 7 7 8 • • • 1.1 • « • -4 .9 8.3 
Other 122 134 132 • « • 31.5 • • « 9.8 -1 .5 ... 
Total 542 636 646 567 100.0 100.0 17.5 1.4 -12.3 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis o f data supplied by the Central Bank o f Nicaragua. 
(a ) Prel iminary f i g u r e s . 
( b ) The percentage breakdown and growth rates are based on rea l , not rounded f i g u r e s . 
Table 10 
NICARAGUA: IMPORTS OF GOODS, CIF 
Percentage 
Mi l l i ons of do l l a rs breakdown (b ) Growth rates (b ) 
1976 1977 1978 1979(a) 1970 1979(a) 1977 1978 1979(a) 
Consumer goods 145 181 148 88 29.2 24.6 24.8 -18.5 -40.8 
Non-durable 95 110 98 e * « 19.0 • • a 15.8 -10.1 a » « 
Durable 50 71 5C • • • 10.2 • • • 42.0 -29.6 
Intermediate goods 274 387 333 213 47.6 59.5 41.6 -14.2 -35.7 
Fuels and lubricants "68 103 '89 80 5.7 22.3 51.5 -13-6 -9 .7 
Othtrs 
For agr iculture 19 40 37 14 • • 0 3.9 110.5 -8 .6 -60.6 
For industry 156 212 1S1 104 t <» • 29.1 35.9 -14.7 -42.6 
For construction 31 32 26 15 « o • 4.2 3.2 -19.9 -41.4 
Capital goods 113 193 114 57 23.2 15.9 70.8 -41.2 -49.4 
For agr iculture 13 22 13 5 1.8 1.4 69.2 -41.4 -60.5 
For industry 76 118 75 38 17.0 10.6 55.3 -36.1 -48.8 
For transport 24 53 26 14 4.4 3.9 120.8 -52.2 -45.9 
Total 532 761 595 358 100.0 100.0 43.2 -22.0 -39.6 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis o f o f f i c i a l data. 
(a ) Preliminary f i gu r e s . 
(b ) The percentage breakdown and growth rates are based on rea l , not rounded f i gures . 
Table 11 
NICARAGUA: MAIN INDICATORS OF FOREIGN TRADE 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 ' 1979(a) 
Growth rates 
Exports of goods, FOB 
Value 36.6 -1 .3 44.5 17.4 1.6 -12.-3 
Volume 8.3 6.2 14.7 -17.1 6.7 -14.6 
Unit value 26.1 -7.0 26.0 41.7 -4.9 2.7 
Imports of goods, FOB 
Value 65.3 -10.8 0.6 45.2 -21.4 -39.5 
Volume 25.3 -22.4 -2 .7 36.6 -28.6 -47.2 
Unit value 31.8 15.0 3.4 6.3 10.0 14.6 
Terms of trade -4 3 -19.1 21.9 33.3 -13.6 -10.3 
Indexes (1970 = 100) 
Terms of trade 98.2 79.4 96.8 129.0 111.5 100.0 
Purchasing power of exports of goods 131.6 113.0 158.0 174.5 161.0 123.3 
Purchasing power of exports o f goods 
and serv ices 133.7 1 19.1 156.7 171.5 168.3 124.7 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis o f o f f i c i a l data, 
( a ) Preliminary f i gu res . 
Table 12 
NICARAGUA: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
(Mi l l i ons o f d o l l a r s ) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 19790 
Current account 
Exports o f goods and se rv i ces 451 456 623 73 2 770 631 
Goods FOB (b ) 380 375 542 636 646 567 
Services 71 81 81 96 124 64 
Transport 16 25 26 29 28 29 
Travel 23 26 28 34 25 18 
Imports of goods and serv i ces 665 604 604 857 710 491 
Goods FOB (b ) 540 482 485 704 553 335 
Services 125 122 119 153 157 156 
Transport 58 56 50 68 56 44 
Travel 33 32 35 46 60 60 
Net payments of p r o f i t s and in t e r es t 
on f o re i gn cap i t a l -59 -54 -67 -68 -94 -56 
P r o f i t s -37 -24 -26 -28 -34 
In te res t -22 -30 -41 -40 -60 
Net pr ivate t rans fe r payments 6 7 1 1 1 -
Balance on current account -267 -195 -47 -192 -33 84 
Capita l account 
-84 Net external f inancing (a+b+c+d+e) 267 195 47 192 33 
a ) Long-term cap i ta l 172 152 45 208 40 
Direct investment ( n e t ) 14 11 13 10 6 
Pr ivate sec tor 67 61 17 61 6 
Loans 80 81 55 97 58 
Amortization payments -13 -17 -31 -35 -45 
Other net l i a b i l i t i e s and assets - -3 -7 .-1 -7 
O f f i c i a l sector 91 80 15 137 28 
Loans 100 87 34 165 57 
Amortization payments -8 -6 -16 -24 -23 
Other net l i a b i l i t e s and assets -1 -1 -3 -4 -6 
Monetary au thor i t i e s (ne t ) • -136 
b) Short-term cap i ta l ( ne t ) 58 45 -28 -25 -157 
Pr ivate sec tor 55 48 -10 -23 -186 
O f f i c i a l sector 12 -2 -4 3 -2 
Monetary au thor i t i e s 1 - -15 1 39 
Errors and omissions -10 -1 1 -6 -8 
Extraordinary f inancing - 26 14 3 55 
c ) A l l oca t ions o f Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs) 
d) O f f i c i a l t rans fe r payments 9 10 8 10 7 . 
e ) In ternat iona l reserves 
(minus s ign s i g n i f i e s an increase ) 28 -38 8 -4 88 52 
Use of IMF c r ed i t -3 7 -8 -8 - ... 
Other l i a b i l i t i e s - -2 10 6 -10 ... 
Monetary gold - - - - -
Special Drawing Rights - 2 2 - -1 
IMF reserve pos i t ion - - - - -
Foreign exchange and other assets 31 -45 4 -2 99 ... 
Source: 1974-1978: Internat ional Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; v o l . 30, 
1979: CEPAL, on the basis of, o f f i c i a l data. 
( a ) Prel iminary f i g u r e s . 
(b ) Including non-monetary go ld . 
Table 13 
NICARAGUA: INDICATORS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS(a) 
(Millions of dollars) 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978(b) 1979(c) 
Public external debt (d) 503 644 681 912 961 1 159 
Servicing of public 
external debt 49 56 88 98 103 80 
Amortization payments 20 20 40 50 52 11 
Interest payments 29 36 48 48 51 69 
Servicing of public external 
debt, as a percentage of total 
exports (e) 10.9 12.3 14.1 13.4 13.4 12.7 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Nicaragua. 
(a) End-year balance of debts having a term of over one year. 
(b) On 3 A December 1978 the short-term debt amounted to US$ 131 aillion; commitments in respect of 
guaranteed to US$ 36 million; private debt not guranteed by the State to US$ 264 million and 
State-guaranteed private debt to US$ 6 million. 
(c) Preliminary figures. 
(d) Disbursed. 
(e) Percentages based on real, not rounded figures. 
Table 14 
NICARAGUA: EVOLUTION OF DOMESTIC PRICES(a) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Variation December to December 
Consumer price index 1.9 6.2 10.2 4. 3 70.3 
Food, beverages and 
tobacco -0.5 8.1 10.7 1. .6 97.7 
Clothing 2.3 2.5 2.6 4. .3 46.0 
Housing 3.5 5.0 8.9 7. .9 35.3 
Others 4.6 5.2 12.6 5. ,5 65.7 
Variation between annual averages 
Consumer price index " 1.8 2.9 11.4 4. .6 48.5 
Food, beverages and 
tobacco 0.7 1.2 14.8 3. .6 63.3 
Clothing 2.8 0.6 2.8 3. .3 26.1 
Housing 2.8 4. 1 6.9 6. ,4 27.8 
Others 2.5 5.1 12.4 4. .8 44.8 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of data supplied lay the Central 
Bank of Nicaragua, 
(a) Consumer price index f c the Managua metropolitan area. 
Table 15 
NICARAGUA: EVOLUTION OF WAGES AND SALAMES (a) 
1976 1977 1W8 1979(b) 
Indexes (1975 = 100) 
Wages and salaries 
Nominal 105.0 115.0 121.2 147.5 
Real 102.1 100.4 ICE.4 82.9 
Growth rates 
Wages and salaries 
Nominal 5.0 9.6 4.5 22.7 
Real 2.1 -1.6 - -17.4 
Source: CEPAL, on the basis of data supplied by the Central 
Bank of Nicaragua. 
(a) For workers covered by the Nicaraguan Social Security 
Institute. 
(b) Preliminary figures. 
Table 16 
NICARAGUA: MONETARY BALANCE 
Balance at end of year 
(millions of córdobas) Growth rates 
1977 1978 1979(a) 1979(b) 1977 1978 1979(b) 
Money 1 835 1 928 2 278 3 409 6.2 5.1 76.8 
Currency outside banks 701 866 1 007 1 539 10.2 2 0 " 73.7 
Demand deposits 1 085 1 002 1 207 1 800 2.0 -7.6 79.6 
Other deposits 49 40 64 70 75.0 -18.4 75.0 
Factors of expansion 3 971 3 797 4 035 • • • 3.7 -4.4 • • • 
Foreign assets (net) 206 -1 282 -1 493 . . . (c ) -67.1 0 • » • • • 
Domestic credit 3 765 5 079 5 528 7 618 17.6 34.9 50.0 
Government (net) 145 724 1 145 1 554 -10.5 399.3 114.6 
Official entities 22 55 55 512 -68.1 150.0 830.9 
Private sector and APP (d) 3 539 3 877 3 740 4 692 " 
•11 1 
9.6 21.0 
Other financial institutions 59 423 588 860 
21.1 
616.9 103.3 
Factors of absorption 2 136 1 869 1 757 ,,, 1.7 -12.5 « • • 
Quasi-money (savings and time deposits) 1 148 992 860 900 5.9 -13.6 -9.3 
Credit from the United States Federal 
Reserve System (net) 170 250 290 299 41.7 47.1 19.6 
Other long-tern foreign borrowing 396 340 523 520 -11.2 -14.1 52.9 
Other items (net) 422 287 84 ... -6.2 -32.0 « « « 
Source : CEPAL, on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank of Nicaragua. 
(a) In June 1979. 
(b) Preliminary figures. 
(c) The gross international reserves amounted to 567 million cof-dobas in June 1979 and to 1 385 
million cordobas in December 1979. 
(d) The Area de Propiedad del Pueblo (APP) Includes enterprises confiscated when the new 
administration assumed power. 
Table 17 
NICARAGUA: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
Millions of córdobas Growth rates (b) 
1976 1977 1978 1979(a) 1977 1978 1979(a) 
1. Current income 1 527 1 796 1 658 1 731 17.6 -7.7 4.4 
Tax revenue 1 352 1 638 1 448 1 431 21.2 -11.6 -1.2 
Direct 350 392 363 307 12.0 -7.4 -15.5 
Indirect 628 752 701 706 19.7 -6.8 0.6 
On foreign trade 374 494 384 418 32.0 -22.2 8.9 
Non-tax revenue 175 15 8 210 300 -9.9 33.2 43.4 
2. Current expenditure 1 210 1 539 1 979 2 383 27.2 28.6 20j,4 
Wages and salaries 547 588 702 1 314 7.6 19.3 87.2 
Other current expenditure 663 951 1 277 1 069 43.3 34.4 -16.4 
3. Saving on current account 
(1-2) 317 257 -321 -652 -19.2 103.1 
4. Capital expenditure 969 1 539 . 1 203 589 58.7 -21.8 -52.0 
Real investment 370 921 402 320 148.8 -56.3 -20.4 
Debt amortization payments 156 238 382 65 52.2 60.5 -83.0 
Other capital expenditure 443 380 419 204 -14.2 10.3 -51.4 
5. Total expenditure (2+4) 2 179 3 078 3 182 2 972 41.2 3.4 -6.6 
6. Fiscal deficit (1-5) -652 -1 282 -1 524 -1 241 96.6 18.9 -18.6 
7. Financing of deficit 
Domestic financing 283 130 1 147 1 146 -54.0 780.2 -0.1 
External financing 369 1 152 377 95 212.1 -67.3 -74.9 
Source: CEPAL, estimated on the basis of data supplied by the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance 
of Nicaragua. 
(a) Preliminary figures. 
(b) Growth rates based on real, not rounded figures. 
